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Citizens’ ideology drives ideological polarization and
partisanship in U.S state legislatures
The increasing partisanship and polarization present Congress has been subject to a great deal
of study and many explanations as to its causes have been put forward. Justin H. Kirkland
takes a different line in investigating polarization, by looking at how it varies between state
legislatures. Using survey and roll call vote data from across the country, he argues that in those
states with more ideologically disparate populations, legislative districts will become more
extreme as people sort into them. This in turn will lead to their legislators expressing a higher
degree of partisanship in the state legislature.
“Too often bipartisanship is equated with centrism or deal cutting. Bipartisanship is not the
opposite of principle. One can be very conservative or very liberal and still have a bipartisan
mindset. Such a mindset acknowledges that the other party is also patriotic and may have some
good ideas.” – Richard Lugar, 2012
Following his defeat at the hands of Richard Mourdock in the Republican primary for Indiana’s Senate seat,
former Senator Richard Lugar (R-IN) issued a scathing appraisal of the U.S. Congress’s ability to function in the
face of hyper-partisanship. He also provided the above reminder that the ability to cooperate in face of
disagreement had long been the hallmark of the U.S. Senate. However, like citizens and U.S. House members,
the Senate was increasingly a chamber characterized by exceedingly strong partisanship.
That Congress has become more partisan is fairly well-established. Where this increased partisanship originates
is a question with which scholars are still wrestling. Rather than pushing on the questions of legislative
polarization and partisanship from the perspective of the changes in Congress, I take a slightly different cut at the
question. While Congress is hyper-partisan, the degree of polarization, partisanship, and party loyalty in U.S.
state legislatures varies dramatically. In my research, I use this variance to assess the roots of legislative
polarization and party cohesion.
In particular, I argue that legislators are generally election oriented, and try to make decisions about how to
support their party based on how that decision will influence their chances at re-election. If a legislator’s decision
to support his or her party hurts his or her re-election chances, I expect that legislator to be less likely to support
his or her party than a legislator who would not face electoral consequences from that same decision. A pretty
straightforward implication of this way of thinking is that legislators from extreme districts should be generally
more likely to support their party than legislators from moderate districts, who might vote across party lines more
often.
This should mean that the aggregate level of party loyalty (that is, the total party loyalty in a particular party) ought
to be related to the number of moderate districts the legislators in a party represent. A party made up of legislators
from ideologically extreme districts ought to be quite loyal/cohesive while a party made up of a mix of legislators
from extreme and moderate districts should be much less cohesive. The important question, then, is what
determines the nature of legislative districts?
My work suggests that an important factor in the makeup of legislative districts in a state is the heterogeneity or
variance in the ideology of citizens in that state. The argument works like this. States with highly homogeneous
populations where citizens’ preferences are all similar to one another get sliced up into legislative districts that are
all themselves quite similar to each other. States made up of really heterogeneous populations where citizens
hold highly varying views about issues of governance and politics don’t just get sliced up into heterogeneous
districts, they get sliced up into extreme districts. Because citizens have a weak tendency to live around others
like them, and because districts are imperfect samples of a state population, the odds of getting a set of
ideologically extreme legislative districts go up quite quickly in states made up of heterogeneous populations, and
as I pointed out earlier, extreme districts equal polarized, partisan legislators. In other words, the aggregate level
of partisanship in a legislature is fundamentally related to the heterogeneity of citizens’ ideology. If legislators
care about what their citizens want, then at least some of the blame for partisanship and polarization ought to lie
at the feet of the citizens those legislators represent.
To see whether this sort of a story lines up well with reality, I construct measures of the ideological heterogeneity
of citizens in a state using survey responses to the 2006 Cooperative Congressional Election Study. I then build
measures of partisanship and polarization in state legislatures using both roll call voting and bill cosponsorship
data from every state legislature in the country in 2007 (an analysis of over 100,000 bills). I then build two pretty
simple statistical models; one predicting the ideological distance between legislative parties during roll call, and
the other predicting probability that legislators work across party lines during cosponsorship. The results quite
clearly indicate that states with very heterogeneous populations have more polarized roll call voting and more
partisan cosponsorship environments.
A quick way to see these effects is to show the distribution of “ideal points” derived from the roll call voting of
legislators in both parties in two states. Ideal point estimates are summaries of roll call voting behavior by
legislators. Polarized parties have very little overlap in the ideal point estimates of legislators in the two parties,
while moderate parties have a great deal of overlap implying that members of both parties vote across party lines
often. Two states that are useful for comparison purposes are Illinois and Wisconsin. My survey evidence
indicates that Wisconsin is much more heterogeneous than Illinois, so we should expect that the Wisconsin
legislature is much more polarized than the Illinois legislature. 
Figure 1 – Simulated distribution of legislative ideal points as the heterogeneity of citizen ideology
changes
Figure 1 plots the polarization of voting from the lower legislative chambers of Illinois and Wisconsin. As you can
see, the overlap between the Democratic and Republican ideal points in Illinois is quite large, indicating the
Republicans and Democrats voted similarly with regularity in that chamber. Contrast that with the non-existent
overlap in the voting behavior of the Republicans and Democrats in the lower chamber of Wisconsin’s legislature.
Generally, these legislative chambers are pretty similar. They’re geographic neighbors, both full-time, both grant
redistricting control to the legislature, and both use two-year terms. Nevertheless, the Wisconsin legislative parties
are both much more polarized and much more cohesive than the Illinois legislative parties. My work suggests that
this is at least partly due to the ideological divisions among citizens in those states.
There are a number of practical implications of my results. One of the important steps in my argument is that
heterogeneous citizen populations get turned into extreme legislative districts, and that this facilitates extreme
behavior by individual legislators. While political scientists continue to debate what role redistricting plays in
polarization, the simple act of creating legislative districts at all plays some role in the levels of polarization we
see. It is also worth noting that while the American public professes a preference for bipartisan behavior, when
confronted with choices between partisan policy outcomes and bipartisan policy-making, most citizens prefer
partisan outcomes. Unless the public provides legislators with an electoral incentive to be bipartisan (and it
doesn’t appear as though that is likely), partisan, polarized legislative politics will continue to be the norm in U.S.
legislatures. 
This article is based on the paper ‘Ideological Heterogeneity and Legislative Polarization in the United States’ in
Political Research Quarterly.
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